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JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE RULE
OF REASON
Spencer Weber Waller*
VER the past thirty-plus years, Justice Stevens has played a special role in the jurisprudence of antitrust. He came to the Supreme Court after a successful career as an antitrust litigator,
scholar, law teacher, and federal appellate judge. Justice Stevens applied
the special insights this background provided to articulate a unique voice
in shaping antitrust. While much of the antitrust debate since World War
II has concerned the proper legal standard for assessing the competitive
impact of agreements under the antitrust laws, Justice Stevens focused
much of his analytical work for the Court on a more sophisticated, but no
less important, question: How should a court actually determine whether
an agreement unreasonably restricts competition in violation of the antitrust laws? In antitrust terms, the question for Justice Stevens was not so
much whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applied in a particular
case, but what the rule of reason actually means and how should it be
applied.
In this article, I examine the distinctive voice Justice Stevens brought to
antitrust, some of the personal and professional influences that created
this voice, and the impact he had on the antitrust jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court in defining the rule of reason and its application. I argue
that Justice Stevens, more than any justice, helped define the rule of reason as a single unitary continuum in analyzing agreements under Section
1 of the Sherman Act and further defined what counted as potential legitimate justifications under the rule.
Part I lays out Justice Stevens's student and early professional career
and the influence that Professor James Rahl of Northwestern University
School of Law had on Justice Stevens and his antitrust philosophy.' Part
II analyzes the litigation practice, scholarly writing, and limited antitrust
appellate opinions of then-Judge Stevens for clues as to his evolving anti* Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Lindsay Frank Dansdil, Jillian Brady, and Thomas

Weber for their research assistance; Alex Tsesis, Danny Sokol, Andrew Gavil, and Edward
Brunet for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts; Wanda Martinson, Justice Blackmun's former secretary, for her deciphering of his notes; the archivists at Columbia Law
School and the University of Chicago, and in particular John Jacobs, archivist, Washington

& Lee University School of Law, for his personal assistance in accessing the papers of
Justice Lewis Powell.
1. Professor James Rahl was both Justice Stevens's and my antitrust professor at
Northwestern, albeit nearly forty years apart. See infra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
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trust philosophy. Part III examines the numerous Supreme Court opinions authored by Justice Stevens which analyze the critical issue of what
the rule of reason actually means when it applies in a case. Finally, I
conclude that Justice Stevens's most important contribution in antitrust
was to redefine the rule of reason from an empty analytical box in which
defendants automatically prevailed into the core tool of modern antitrust
law in which courts conduct a more meaningful analysis of the competitive impact of agreements.
I.

THE MAKINGS OF AN ANTITRUST SPECIALIST

For his legal education, Stevens attended Northwestern University Law
School where he was editor-in-chief of the law review 2 and graduated in
1947 after only two years with what was believed to be the highest grade
point average in the history of the law school. 3 There he met one of his
formative antitrust influences-Professor James Rahl.
Rahl had been a bit of a wunderkind himself, having also served as
editor-in-chief of the law review at Northwestern prior to his graduation
in 1942. Following four years with the Office of Price Administration and
the U.S. Army, he returned to teach at Northwestern in 1946. Rahl spent
the remainder of his career (not counting leaves of absence and sabbati4
cals) at Northwestern specializing in antitrust and tort law.
He taught Stevens antitrust in the 1946-47 academic year. This was his
first year of teaching and he was only three years Stevens's senior. This
began a life-long personal and professional relationship that ended only
with Rahl's death in 1994. According to Justice Stevens, Rahl "was a
warm friend" who stimulated "a strong motivation to excel and to be2. Northwestern's law review was called the Illinois Law Review from 1906 until 1952
when the name was changed to the present Northwestern University Law Review. John
Paul Stevens, A Personal History of the Law Review, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 25 (2006).
3. ConfirmationHearing on the Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 4 (1975) (statement of Sen. Charles Percy) [hereinafter Confirmation
Hearing]; David M. O'Brien, Filling Justice 0. Douglas's Seat: President GeraldFord's Appointment of Justice John Paul Stevens, 1989 Y.B. Sup. CT. HIST. Soc. 20; Jeffrey Rosen,
The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007 at 50, 55; Supreme Court Historical Society, John Paul Stevens, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/myweb/justice/stevens.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
4. See Wolfgang Saxon, James A. Rahl, 77, Ex-Dean and Expert on Antitrust Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, at C41. Rahl also served as Dean of the Law School from 1972
through 1977. Id. Besides antitrust courses, Rahl taught both basic and advanced torts
and co-authored the later editions of the legal realist torts casebooks originally created by
Leon Green. See generally LEON GREEN, ADVANCED TORTS: INJURIES TO BUSINESS, POLITICAL AND FAMILY INTERESTS (1977); LEON GREEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS
ed. 1977); LEON GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS (1968).

(2d

Professor Rahi later became one of the leading early generation of scholars to study the
application of United States antitrust laws to international business transactions and the
development of the competition law of the European Communities. See generally JAMES

A. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT
(1970); James A. Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974). See also Biography, James A. RahI (1917-1994) Papers, 19381995, Northwestern University Archives (on file with author).
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come knowledgeable about the intricacies of antitrust law. He was a
'5
wonderful teacher, so thoughtful and decent. We all loved him."
After Stevens completed his Supreme Court clerkship with Justice Wiley Rutledge, he spurned overtures to teach at Yale and returned to Chicago to practice as an associate with one of the larger downtown law
firms in 1949.6 He returned to Washington, D.C. to serve in 1951 as Associate Counsel to the House Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power. 7 He then founded a new firm back in Chicago with other associates from his prior firm and practiced as a named partner at the new firm
until he became a Seventh Circuit judge in 1970.8 He also taught antitrust
as a lecturer, first at Northwestern, as a colleague of Rahl, and later at the
University of Chicago Law School. 9
Even after Stevens focused full time on private practice, he and Rahl
remained close and frequently participated in conferences and bar association programs. One important professional aspect of their relationship
was their service together on the 1955 Attorney General's Committee to
Review the Antitrust Laws, the premier blue ribbon commission in the
history of antitrust. 10
Both Rahl and Stevens came of age as antitrust professionals at a critical stage in the history of U.S. antitrust law. Beginning with the SoconyVacuum decision in 1940,11 the Supreme Court established an ever-growing number of per se rules categorically barring different types of both
horizontal and vertical agreements between businesses. Socony-Vacuum
12
established a per se prohibition on price fixing between competitors.
By the end of the 1950s, most tying cases, nearly all exclusive dealing
arrangements, and most boycotts were added to the list of per se or quasiper se offenses. 13 The price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-

5. James Andrew Rahl, October 8, 1917-December29, 1994, Nw. L. ALUMNI MAG.

1995, at 9 (on file with author).
6. KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE
OF JOHN PAUL STEVENS 38-39 (2001). The firm was Poppenhausen, Johnston, Thompson
& Raymond, which is today known as Jenner & Block. History of Jenner & Block, http://
www.jenner.com/firm/ourfirm.asp?type=History (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
7. MANASTER, supra note 6, at 38-39. That subcommittee, chaired by Representative
Emmanuel Celler, focused primarily on studies of the extent of monopoly power in such
industries as aluminum, newsprint, and professional baseball, but also included issues of
monopoly more generally and resale price maintenance. Neither Section 1 nor the rule of
reason was part of the Subcommittee's mission or work product.
8. Id. at 39. Originally named Rothschild, Hart, Stevens & Myers, the firm continues
to exist today under the name Rothschild, Barry & Myers. Rothschild, Barry & Myers
LLP: About the Firm, http://www.rbmchicago.com/about (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
9. MANASTER, supra note 6, at 39.
10. See infra Part II.
11. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
12. Id. at 224 n.59.
13. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); N. Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. 293
(1949).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Patman Act 14 were being strictly interpreted, and Congress passed the
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950 dramatically expanding the15coverage and impact of the anti-merger provisions of the Clayton Act.
The cumulative effect of these statutory and case law developments
6
was a certain analytical aridness to antitrust law. Categories ruled.'
Once a business practice was identified as per se unlawful, it was summarily condemned without further analysis or consideration of justification.
Conversely, once some type of commercial agreement was identified as
subject to the rule of reason, the analysis became almost completely
open-ended and the defendant was certain to prevail.
Professor Rahl rebelled against both of these ways of looking at agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and sought to give greater
meaning and clarity to their analysis beyond the labels "per se" and "rule
of reason.' 1 7 In analyzing the common law antecedents of the antitrust
laws and the early cases under the Sherman Act, he argued that the rule
of reason was a rule of interpretation that governed all cases under Section 1.18 The rule of reason, as adopted in Standard Oil,19 was necessary
to prevent the Sherman Act from sweeping within its ambit and prohibiting all commercial agreements and contracts, regardless of the effect on
competition. Thus, under the rule of reason Section 1 of the Sherman
Act prohibited only those agreements which were unreasonable in the
special sense of being unreasonably restrictive of competition. This also
meant that arguments that the agreement injured competition, but nonetheless benefitted society in some other way, were irrelevant under the
20
rule of reason.
Rahl argued that the per se rule was really a presumption of unreasonableness which cut off further defense or justification of the agreement in
question. 2 1 At the same time, he contended that the per se rule had to be
connected to a likelihood of harm to competition, otherwise any pre14. See e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 39 (1948) (holding that discriminating in price between different purchasers violated Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2006).
16. For a contemporary take on how antitrust has evolved from an emphasis on categories towards a reliance on core concepts, see generally ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E.
KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY

(2d ed. 2008).

17. Rahl also insisted that the proper phonetic Latin pronunciation of "per se" was
"per see" and the not commonly used "per say." I still do not know which would have
been correct in ancient Rome.
18. James A. Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule-Prefaceand Perspec-

tive, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 137, 139-40 (1962).
19. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
20. Rahl, supra note 18, at 146-47. ("[E]ven if the arrangement were greatly beneficial
to the national interest in lower prices, better quality, military defense, full employment,
foreign trade, health and safety, good morals, and exploration of outer space, it would still
be illegal under the rule of reason as that rule has evolved.").
21. James A. Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflec-

tions on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L.

REV.

1165, 1169 (1959).
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sumption of unreasonableness would not make sense. 22 Certain practices
like tying and boycotts required proof of certain facts of likely market
impact before the presumption of unreasonableness should attach and cut
off further analysis or justification by the defendants. 23 Furthermore,
great care had to be exercised before employing overly broad labels and
24
categories in creating per se rules.
Professor Rahl was equally concerned that applying the rule of reason
should not be a meaningless open-ended exercise in which defendants
always prevailed. In his writings and lectures, he argued for giving
greater meaning and structure to the rule of reason than the Supreme
Court's invitation in the Chicago Board of Trade case to consider:
[T]he facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
While Professor Rahl struggled with these and other antitrust issues as
an academic and legal consultant, Justice Stevens soon had the opportunity to do so as a full-time practitioner, appellate judge, and finally associate justice of the Supreme Court where he could more directly fill in the
missing analytical pieces of the rule of reason. I do not suggest a linear
relationship where Professor Rahl's teachings and writings were the
cause, or even the most important cause, of Justice Stevens views about
antitrust. Some of Rahl's views were developed after Stevens graduated
and was himself a leader in the antitrust bar. Stevens had many other
influential friends and mentors in the antitrust community, including Edward Levi and Aaron Director at the University of Chicago, who held
very different views of how the law should develop. 25 However, I do suggest that these views were the starting point for a dialogue between Rahl
and Stevens that continued for decades and can be seen in places where
lawyer Stevens, Judge Stevens, and later Justice Stevens made important
contributions to antitrust jurisprudence.
II.

PRIOR TO THE COURT

Justice Stevens did not merely study, teach, and write about antitrust
law, he practiced it nearly full-time. He is the only member of the current
22. Id. at 1172-73.
23. See id. at 1173-74.

24. Id. at 1173-74.
25. For the development and spread of the Chicago School view of antitrust, see Spencer Weber Waller, Abstract, The Law and Economics Virus, available at http://pa-

pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1017882.
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Supreme Court who made his living trying cases prior to joining the
was an antitrust
bench. He is also the only member of the Court who
26
specialist as a practitioner rather than an academic.
Justice Stevens practiced most of his career at the firm he founded,
which was known as Rothschild, Hart, Stevens & Meyers. It was a medium-sized litigation firm with a heavy antitrust practice, in large part due
to Stevens's skill and reputation. He practiced with the firm from its
founding in 1952 until he joined the Seventh Circuit in 1970.27 While in
private practice, he served as counsel of record in eighteen reported trial
and appellate decisions involving various antitrust issues and appeared in
numerous matters for which there is no reported decision. As counsel for
plaintiffs, he lost where he could not establish a per se violation and prevailed as a defendant where the plaintiff failed to do so, 28 but had to take
the cases and clients as they came. Thus, he could not systematically focus on any other single issue in antitrust.
As a Seventh Circuit judge, Stevens heard and wrote opinions on a
disproportionate number of antitrust cases. He sat on fifteen of the
thirty-two antitrust cases that the court heard during his time on the Seventh Circuit. 29 Of those fifteen cases, Stevens was the author of nine antitrust opinions and one dissent, and he was part of one per curiam
decision. 30 These opinions included diverse subjects including the Robinson-Patman Act, monopolization law, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
31
but none directly focused on the core meaning of the rule of reason.
26. See MANASTER, supra note 6, at 38-39. In contrast, Justice Breyer is a well-known
antitrust specialist whose pre-judicial experience in the area was primarily academic and
legislative, rather than practice. Other prominent justices with substantial antitrust practice experience include Justices Abe Fortas, Thomas Clark, and Robert Jackson. In an
earlier era, Justices Taft and Brandeis also came to the Court with considerable knowledge
and interest in the antitrust laws. See generally Supreme Court Historical Society,
www.supremecourthistory.org (containing biographical information on the justices) (last
visited Feb. 3, 2009).
27. See MANASTER, supra note 6, at 38-39.
28. Parmalee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir. 1961) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in case alleging conspiracy to restrain trade in transfer of
passengers between Chicago rail stations).
29. Robert E. Riggs & L. Cordell McCarrey, Justice Stevens and the Law of Antitrust,
43 U. Prr. L. REV. 649, 663-64 (1982).
30. Id.
31. See generally Arenson v. Chi. Merc. Exch., 520 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming
lower court order that defendant had not violated earlier consent decree); Avnet v. FTC,
511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming FTC order barring acquisition); Corning Glass
Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming FTC cease and desist order barring
resale price maintenance falling outside of fair trade statutes); Mullis v. Arco Petroleum
Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974) (reversing injunction for plaintiff and holding that defendant had not violated Robinson-Patman Act); Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d
585 (7th Cir. 1973) (affirming holding that defendant violated interlocking director provisions of Clayton Act); Fison Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1972) (affirming
denial of motion to quash service); Thill Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 469 F.2d 14 (7th
Cir. 1972) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to lack of finality of district court
order denying motion to refer issue to SEC); Bailey v. Logan Square Typographers, Inc.,
441 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1971) (remanding complaint raising intellectual property and antitrust
claims for resolution of common law claims); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings &
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In addition to litigation and service on the lower court, Stevens was
also an active member of various bar associations, participating in panels
on such diverse topics as patent-antitrust issues, distribution law, and the
Robinson-Patman Act. He published widely on the full range of antitrust
topics, with many of the articles
growing out of his presentations at these
32
conferences and symposia.
He also served as one of the most junior members of the 1955 Attorney
General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, the premier blue ribbon panel convened to consider antitrust reform. 33 The 1955 Committee
was a veritable "who's who" of antitrust law and economics and included
Stevens's former teacher, Rahl.34 The Committee's work began in 1953
when Stevens was only six years out of law school.
The 1955 Attorney General's Report would have been the perfect opportunity to set forth a systematic philosophy of the antitrust laws for the
committee, but it was not to be. Stevens served as an active, but not
vocal, member of the Legal and Economic Concepts Work Group which
drafted key sections of the report, including the discussion of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. 35 Professor Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law
School was the principal drafter of this section of the Report, and while
Lewis, Inc., 452 F. 2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971) (reversing dismissal of patent claims and awarding
attorneys' fees for antitrust violation).
32. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Robinson-Patman Act Prohibitions,38 CHI. BAR
REC. 310 (1956); John Paul Stevens, Defense of Meeting the Lower Price of a Competitor, in
1953 MICH. U. INST. ON FED. ANTITRUST LAWS (1953) [hereinafter Stevens, Defense of
Meeting the Lower Price];John Paul Stevens, Exemptions from Antitrust Coverage, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 706 (1972); John Paul Stevens, Cost Justification, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 413
(1963); John Paul Stevens, The Regulation of Railroads, 19 ANTITRUST L.J. 355 (1961);
John Paul Stevens, Tying, in CONFERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT (1955) [hereinafter Stevens, Tying Arrangements]; John
Paul Stevens, Book Review, 28 NOTRE DAME L. 430 (1952) (reviewing ABA SECTION OF
ANTrrRUST LAW: PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
SEPTEMBER 17-18 (1952); Edward R. Johnston & John Paul Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply to ProfessorRostow, 44 ILL. L. REV. 269 (1949).
33. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS (1955) [hereinafter 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]. The 1955 At-

torney General's Report was preceded by the Temporary National Economic Committee
of the 1930s which was a combination of primarily an empirical study of the structure and
performance of the American economy and only secondarily a study of the current and
recommended role of antitrust law. But see M. Handler, A Study of the Construction and
Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws (TNEC Monograph No. 38 1941). Subsequent
to the 1955 Attorney General's Report, there have been blue ribbon commissions in 1969,
1979, an internationally focused study in the 1990s, and the most recent Antitrust Modernization Commission. There is a general consensus that the 1955 Attorney General's Committee was the most prestigious and most influential exercise of this nature. Stephen
Calkins, Antitrust Modernization:Looking Backwards, 31 J. CORP. L. 421 (2006); Albert A.
Foer, Half-Time at the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 601, 617-18
(2006) [hereinafter Foer, Half-Time]; Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization
Commission into Perspective, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1029 (2003) [hereinafter Foer, Antitrust
Modernization Commission].
34. 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 34, at vii.
35. Other members of the group included: Walter Adams, Morris Adelman, John
Maurice Clark, Clare Griffin, George Hale, Milton Handler, Alfred Kahn, Kenneth Kimble, Eugene Rostow, Blackwell Smith, and George Stigler with Burke Marshall and Stanley Barnes as conferees. See Milton Handler Collection, Records Group I, Box 10, File 63.
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there are many letters going back and forth disputing different portions
any disagreement on
of the drafts, there is no correspondence to indicate
36
Stevens's part with the materials circulated.
The Report ultimately proved to be more of a restatement of the current law than a critique, particularly with respect to the analysis of Section 1.37 It listed, rather than analyzed, when the full rule of reason
applied and when practices were per se unlawful. Stevens joined in the
report in full and there are no publicly available papers indicating that he
views as to the description of the antitrust world
expressed any differing
38
as it existed in 1955.
Stevens's only public discussion of the report came in a conference at
Northwestern Law School organized by Professor Rahl marking the release of the report. Stevens contributed a brief comment echoing, but
extending, the report's discussion of tying doctrine, suggesting that the
description of tying as per se unlawful masked a number of situations
39
where tying was in fact helpful or benign in terms of competitive effect.
These scholarly and professional endeavors, while important in their
own right, represent just the foundation upon which Justice Stevens built
his antitrust world view. They also represent the foundation for Justice
Stevens's articulation of a unitary rule of reason based on competitive
effects, and competitive effects alone.
III.

JUSTICE STEVENS IN ACTION

More than any other justice in recent times, Justice Stevens has articulated a comprehensive view of the rule of reason as a rule of interpretation for all of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For Stevens, the rule of
reason is not a stark choice between per se illegality and an endless exploration of intent, effects, and balancing. Instead, he appears to regard the
rule of reason as a continuum where some conduct is presumed to unreasonably restrict competition (and is hence unlawful) where no potential
justifications are permitted. Other conduct is similarly presumed unreasonable only after proof of certain market facts (usually market power)
with no potential justifications allowed in this situation either. Sliding
down the scale is the "quick look," or truncated, rule of reason, which is
really a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness unless the defendant
comes forth with a cognizable procompetitive justification. 40 If none is
36. See id.
37. S. Chester Oppenheim, Highlights of the Final Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 6 (1955) [hereinafter
Oppenheim, Highlights]; S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Remarks on the Report of the Committee, in CONFERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMmilTEE REPORT at 9 (1955) [hereinafter Oppenheim, Remarks on the Report].
38. The only substantive dissent was by Louis Schwartz, who urged a more expansive
view of the role of antitrust for many of the areas covered by the Report. 1955 ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 390.
39. Stevens, Tying Arrangements, supra note 33, at 135.
40. Federal Trade Commission, The Truncated or "Quick Look" Rule of Reason,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/3Persepap.shtm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
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forthcoming, then the conduct is deemed unreasonable, even without
proof of competitive harm. 41 If the defendant comes forth with legally
cognizable and non-pretextual justifications, then the agreement will be
deemed unreasonable if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the harm to
competition outweighs the asserted justifications and benefits.
As the number of true per se rules (presumptions for Stevens) shrinks,
the focus moves toward the middle range of the continuum and the legitimacy of the justifications offered the defendants takes the spotlight. In
case after case, Justice Stevens was willing to limit the application of presumptions of illegality, but he was unwilling to consider any justifications
other than those that related to the competitive impact of the practice
under consideration. Social justifications, no matter how appealing, were
relevant only if Congress wished to consider an exception or immunity to
the Sherman Act's regime of economic competition. Such considerations
were irrelevant to the question of whether the agreement unreasonably
restricted competition, as were arguments that competition itself was inappropriate for a particular industry or that the defendants had fixed a
reasonable price. These, too, were questions for Congress; they were not
questions for the Court in adjudicating a particular case under a statute
that mandated economic competition and forbade those agreements
which unreasonably restricted such competition.
This Part begins with a brief look at why it is fair to conclude that
Justice Stevens's rule of reason opinions in fact reflect a deep personal
philosophy rather than a compromise with the other justices who join his
opinions. Part III.B next traces the origin and development of Justice
Stevens's unified rule of reason approach. Part III.C sets forth his focus
on only competitive impacts in applying the rule of reason. Part III.D
examines the curious case of tying agreements where he appeared to follow a slightly different approach, but it concludes that the difference is
not as great as most observers would imagine. Finally, I briefly discuss
the least explored portion of the rule of reason: what to do when the
defendant has in fact offered a legitimate pro-competitive justification,
and the Court must balance the pro-competitive and anti-competitive
consequences of a particular business practice. Neither Justice Stevens
nor any other member of the Court has offered much guidance in this
area.
A.

A

JUSTICE'S VOICE

Several factors complicate analyzing the text of Supreme Court opinions to determine the personal philosophy of an individual justice. 42 The
41. Id.
42. I am ignoring entirely the body of literary theory that argues that the meaning of a
text reflects the perceptions of the interpretative community that is reading and analyzing

the text rather than the intent of the author. See generally SEAN

BURKE, THE DEATH AND
RETURN OF THE AUTHOR: CRITICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY IN BARTHES, FOUCAULT, AND
DERRIDA (1998); H.L. Hix, MORTE D'AUTHOR: AN AUTOPSY (1990); ROLAND BARTHES,

The Death of the Author, in IMAGE Music TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977).
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certiorari and assignment processes make the results of which cases are
heard and who writes the opinions somewhat unpredictable in nature,
because of the need for four votes at the certiorari stage, the decisions at
the weekly conference, and the assignments of the opinions. 43 These assignments balance the need to accommodate work loads and prior assignments, the need to preserve coalitions on a particular case, interpersonal
dynamics among the justices,44and any preferences the justices may have
as to the available opinions.
The opinions themselves typically are not entirely a solo effort by the
individual justice who draws the assignment. The final opinion often is
researched and drafted by law clerks; edited, improved, and approved by
the authoring justice; and then subject to revision and negotiation with
other justices who must decide whether to join, concur, or dissent. 45 Finally, the general secrecy surrounding the Supreme Court makes it particularly tricky to opine with confidence about the views of an individual
justice, particularly for current or recently retired justices whose papers
are not yet in the public domain.
While these concerns are important, they are somewhat less significant
in the case of Justice Stevens' body of antitrust work. First, Justice Stevens tends to be more personally involved in case selection and opinion
writing than many of his contemporaries on the Court. 46 Stevens, virtually alone on the modern Court, does not participate in the "cert pool,"
an informal arrangement where one law clerk reviews all the petitions for
certiorari that arrive during a specified period. 47 In addition, he has had
less clerks over the years than his contemporaries, relying on three law
clerks rather than the full four clerks that Supreme Court Justices are
allowed to hire. 48 Stevens also has a general tendency not only to write
his own first drafts but also frequently drafts short concurrences and dismajority opinions when he
sents in order to offer short comments on the
49
believes something is missing or incorrect.
One could thus infer that more of Justice Stevens's personal effort was
involved in the creation of the opinions, even if the initial draft of any
particular case was prepared by his clerks. Stevens also had the luxury of
developing a line of thought about the rule of reason across a series of
cases in a relatively short period of time. This was followed by a long
period where the Court stopped deciding substantive questions of antitrust and another period where it began to address different areas of anti43. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 28-30 (2007). The opinions are assigned by the Chief Justice when in the majority
and otherwise by the most senior Associate Justice in the majority. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 156.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 156. See also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 272
(1979) (describing origins of the certiorari pool during the Nixon Administration).

48. Id.
49. TOOrN, supra note 44, at 156; Confirmation Hearing,supra note 3, at 41.
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trust law, so Stevens's voice remains relatively undiluted and unmuddied
as to the operation of the rule of reason.
Finally, while we do not have access to Justice Stevens's papers, we do
have access to those of three of his contemporaries. Justices Powell,
Blackmun, and Marshall all made their papers available almost immediately, allowing access to their files on cases during the periods where they
served with Justice Stevens, breaking with a tradition where a retiring
justice's papers were not available during the working lifetimes of his
peers. In particular, the papers of Justice Powell and Blackmun provide a
treasure trove of information for the antitrust scholar. 50 Each was a pack
rat in slightly different ways. Justice Powell kept meticulous notes on
each vote for certiorari, while Justice Blackmun kept similarly meticulous
notes on each case discussed at the weekly conference where initial votes
were taken and opinions assigned. These two Justices also had seemingly
complete case files with correspondence between the Justices about the
cases as draft opinions, concurrences, and dissents were circulated, revised, and finalized. Together, all these sources strongly suggest that Justice Stevens's voice was his own in the series of important antitrust
opinions discussed in the following Sections.
B.

THE UNITY OF THE RULE OF REASON

Stevens began to outline his vision for a broad unitary rule of reason in
his 1978 opinion in National Society of ProfessionalEngineers.5 1 The case
involved a civil Section 1 challenge to a trade association rule which prohibited competitive bidding by engineers on public works projects. Under
this rule, an engineer could not discuss price terms with a client until they
had already been selected for the job (presumably on the basis of reputation, the plans submitted for the project, and any other non-price factors).
Only then would price negotiations ensue. If the client and engineer
could not then reach agreement on price, the whole process was to repeat
itself until the client selected another engineer and then negotiated an
acceptable price arrangement. 52 The defendant argued that the ethical
rule in question was necessary to promote the public health, safety, and
welfare, and prevent substandard engineering resulting from low ball
bids, an argument that Justice Stevens quickly rejected as incompatible
53
with any version of the rule of reason.
As to the nature of the rule of reason itself, Stevens traced its origins

50. See Andrew I. Gavil, Sylvania and the Process of Change in the Supreme Court: A
First Look at the Powell Papers, 17 ArTTRUST 8 (2002).

51. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Interestingly,
Justice Stevens voted against taking certiorari in the case, and the initial vote of the Justices
was not to hear the case. Powell Papers, Case No. 76-1767 (Sept. 27, 1998).
52. Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 684.
53. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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from the English common law case of Mitchel v. Reynolds;54 Judge Taft's
circuit opinion in Addyston Pipe,55 the early Supreme Court cases interpreting the Sherman Act in literalist terms;56 and finally the Supreme
Court's invocation of the rule of reason in Standard Oil.57 He described
the rule of reason derived from Standard Oil as:
[W]hether the challenged contracts or acts "were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." Unreasonableness under that
test could be based either (1) on the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and
enhance prices. Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is
con58
fined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions.
While he acknowledged that the nature of a learned profession might
allow certain practices which might otherwise violate the rule of reason in
purely commercial contexts, 59 he noted shortly thereafter: "While this is
not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement" because they operated as a total ban on60competitive bidding in all contexts
and involving all clients and projects.
Justice Stevens's most explicit analysis of the unitary rule of reason
61
came in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.
Here, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia challenged an NCAA
rule that limited the number of times that any member school's football
team could appear on television in a given season as a violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act.6 2 The plan was adopted in the early days of television to reduce the adverse effect of television on attendance at live football games among the hundreds of NCAA schools.6 3 Under the version
of the plan in effect at the time of the case, the television networks paid
the NCAA fixed sums to broadcast a set number of games during the
season. 64 The networks then negotiated directly with member schools at
65
set fees for a limited number of appearances for any four-year period.
The plan was challenged by schools with strong national followings and
54. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). See also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531 (1983) (discussing

the common law origins of the Sherman Act and the rule of reason).
55. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).

56. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
57. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
58. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).

59. Id. at 686. Justice Stevens's approach tracks the approach of the 1955 Attorney

General's Report, supra note 34, at 11, although at the time this was viewed by the chair of
the Report as merely a semantic clarification. Oppenheim, Highlights, supra note 38, at 7.
60. Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.

61. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
62. Id. at 92.
63. Id. at 91.
64. Id. at 92-93.
65. Id.
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sold out football stadiums who had everything to gain and nothing to lose
from the revision or scrapping of the plan and the very real possibility of
separately negotiating a more lucrative contract on their own.66 The
lower courts characterized the arrangement as a per se unlawful horizontal price fixing or production agreement and rejected each of the defen67
dant's proffered competitive justification.
Justice Stevens began by recognizing that the practices had many of the
characteristics that the antitrust laws summarily held unreasonable. 68 He
stated:
A restraint of this type has often been held to be unreasonable as a
matter of law. Because it places a ceiling on the number of games
member institutions may televise, the horizontal agreement places an
artificial limit on the quantity of televised football that is available to
broadcasters and consumers. By restraining the quantity of televised
rights available for sale, the challenged practices create a limitation
on output; our cases have held that such limitations are unreasonable
restraints of trade. Moreover, the District Court found that the minimum aggregate price in fact operates to preclude any price negotiation between broadcasters and institutions, thereby constituting
horizontal price fixing, perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable re69
straint of trade.
Nonetheless, the Court decided that it would be inappropriate to apply
a per se rule to this case. 70 The decision was not based on a lack of judicial experience with such arrangement or the NCAA's non-profit status,
but rather because "this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all." 7 1 In the Court's view, the product of amateur college sports, and
college football in particular, could not exist without a variety of agreements between the member schools, ranging from prohibiting payments
to student athletes to the actual rules of the games played between the
teams on the field. 72 Because the NCAA rule structure helped create a
new product that could not exist without the horizontal agreement and
because the new product could enhance overall market competition, the
Court refused to condemn the arrangement outright and instead consid73
ered the defendant's justifications for the restraint.
Justice Stevens explained the continuum of the rule of reason in two
key footnotes.7 4 In footnote 26, he stated: "Indeed, there is often no
bright line separating per se from rule of reason analysis. Per se rules
may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evi66. Id.
67. Id. at 95-99. See also infra notes 131-41 and accompanying notes.
68. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1984).

69. Id.
70. Id. at 100.
71. Id. at 100-01.
72. Id. at 101-02.

73. Id. at 103.
74. See id. at 104 n.26, 109 n.39.
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dence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. '75 At the other
end of the spectrum of the rule of reason continuum, he also noted that
the rule of reason can sometimes be applied76 in "the twinkling of an eye"
when the anticompetitive harm is obvious.
He unfortunately then fell back on a more categorical view of the rule
of reason in rejecting the first of the proffered justifications. 77 The defendant argued that the arrangement could not have injured competition because it lacked market power in a broader market for sports
broadcasting. 78 In response, Justice Stevens held that "naked" restraints
on price and output have never required proof of the defendant's market
power and would thus require some affirmative competitive justification,
even in the absence of a detailed market analysis. 79 Second, he concluded that the record had ample evidence of market power in a market
for college football broadcasts that was uniquely appealing to advertisers. 80 He concluded that given the substantial restraints on competition,
the defendants had a "heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifie[d] this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market."181 Given that Stevens rejected each of the
proffered justifications as not legally cognizable, the arrangement was
82
easily condemned under the rule of reason.
Board of Regents was unnecessarily complicated in many ways. While
Justice Stevens was correct that a number of rules governing amateur college sports should not be treated as per se unreasonable, that had little to
do with the restrictions on broadcast rights at issue in the case. 83 There
are certain rules (six points for a touchdown, sixty minutes to a game,
fifteen yard penalty for a flagrant foul) that may not be commercial at all
and are beyond the scope of the Sherman Act entirely. 84 Other rules
relating to the non-payment of athletes may be commercial in nature,
and, hence, subject to some version of the rule of reason, but they are
75. Id. at 104 n.26.
76. Id. at 109 n.39 (citing Phillip Areeda, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN AN'rInUST
ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 37-38 (1981)). Despite invoking this wonderfully apt metaphor, Justice Stevens in fact spent a good deal of time discussing competitive effects and
possible justifications in Board of Regents and other cases, suggesting that the so-called
quick look was never as quick as its name suggested. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Price Fixing,
The Professions, and Ancillary Restraints: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 925, 947 ("Despite its sweeping language condemning horizontal maximum price fixing, the Maricopa County Court reached its decision after careful consideration of the restraint's ancillary nature.").
77. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1980).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 110.
80. Id. at 111.
81. Id. at 113.
82. Id. at 113-20.
83. See generally id.
84. See e.g., Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2008) (enforcement of
rules relating to standards for recruiting student athletes not commercial in nature); Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n, No. 3:97-1249, 2008 WL
2811307 at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2008) (recruiting rules for athletes is athletic and not
commercial in nature).
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necessary to create and maintain the amateur nature of the sport. Others
may arise in an amateur sports setting but are the kind of traditional commercial naked restriction of market behavior that warrant a heavy pre85
sumption of unreasonableness.
In Board of Regents, the restrictions on broadcasting rights had nothing
to do with the non-commercial aspects of college sports or any of the
characteristics of what make it uniquely amateur. Justice Stevens could
easily have acknowledged the need for some version of the rule of reason
for amateur athletes in general and still condemned the specific agreement before him as per se unreasonable. In short, he correctly identified
the spectrum of options along the rule of reason, but may have simply
located this particular restraint farther away from the presumption of illegality then necessary. Whether he did so out of a starry-eyed view of the
amateur athletics, the need to obtain or retain votes for his majority opinion, or any other of the myriad of potential reasons cannot be teased out
of the currently available public sources.
He returned to the theme of a single rule of reason continuum again in
his partial concurrence and partial dissent in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., where he objected to a distinction in substantive antitrust rules
between civil and criminal cases. 86 In discussing the rule of reason, he
cited James Rahl in stating:
[P]roperly understood, rule-of-reason analysis is not distinct from
"per se" analysis. On the contrary, agreements that are illegal per se
are merely a species within the broad category of agreements that
unreasonably restrain trade; less proof is required to establish 87
their
illegality, but they nonetheless violate the basic rule of reason.
Then in the landmark Broadcast Music decision Justice Stevens dissented, not to disagree that the agreement should be judged under the
rule of reason, but to explain why he believed that the agreement was
illegal under the rule of reason and why no remand was necessary. 88
Even in a seemingly unrelated case about the availability of injunctive
relief in private antitrust cases, Justice Stevens paused to observe: "Two
of the most famous prosecutions [of the Theodore Roosevelt era] concluded in 1911, with decisions from this Court endorsing the 'Rule of
Reason' as the principal guide to the construction of the Sherman Act's
85. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (fixing of salaries for
graduate assistant coaches for college basketball teams).
86. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 474 (1978).
87. Id. at 476 (citing James A. Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule-

Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 137, 139 (1962)). Justice Stevens cited this
same article by Rahl in two other cases as well. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co., 495 U.S. 328, 349 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982).
88. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). This was an apparent change from the views Justice Stevens expressed in
the initial court conference on the case where he indicated that the block licensing arrangement was "classic per se." Justice Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes 1-17-79, Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., No. 77-1578, 77-1583.
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'
general language. "89
The majority of the Court endorsed, but muddied, this view of the rule
of reason in the more recent California Dental Association v. FTC case. 90
California Dental concerned rules of an association of dental societies in
California which effectively prohibited certain kinds of price and nonprice advertising in order to stop false and misleading claims. 91 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that the restrictions on price advertising were per se unreasonable. 92 A split Ninth Circuit disagreed, but
nonetheless found that the restrictions violated the abbreviated rule of
reason set forth in Board of Regents, citing the language that the rule of
reason can be applied in the "twinkling of an eye" in the appropriate
case. 93 The majority opinion in the Ninth Circuit that the restrictions on
price advertising were close to a naked restraint of trade and considered
the defendant's justifications of discouraging false advertising unrelated
94
to the specific restrictions at issue in the case.
The Supreme Court was unanimous that a quick look or truncated rule
of reason was appropriate in some cases, but split five-to-four on the
question whether it was appropriate under the facts of the case. 95 In a
short and cryptic opinion by Justice Souter, the Court held that the FTC
erred in applying the quick look standard to any of the California Dental
Association's advertising restrictions. 96 The Court summarized Justice
Stevens's earlier opinions in ProfessionalEngineers and Board of Regents
as permitting a quick look or abbreviated rule of reason where "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets."' 97 The majority was not confident that
the price and non-price restrictions on advertising were either procompetitive, anticompetitive, or merely benign given the uncertainties of how
98
restrictions on advertising operate in markets for professional services.
It reversed the finding of liability in the absence of a detailed market
analysis and a clear showing of competitive harm. 99
The Court, however, endorsed the basic framework of the rule of reason as laid out by Justice Stevens in the previous cases. 100 Souter acknowledged that terms like "per se," "quick look," and "rule of reason"

89. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 286 (1990).
90. See generally Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). For a more detailed
discussion of the case, see Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick
Look but the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (2000).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 760-62.
In the matter of Cal. Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190 (1996).
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 727-28.
Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 782.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 779.
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are less fixed than they appear. 10 1 Some restraints can be condemned
without a "plenary" market analysis, while others may require considerable market analysis before they can be condemned under even a per se
analysis. 10 2 The Court classified the rule of reason as a "spectrum" or a
"sliding scale" and stated: "[T]here is generally no categorical line to be
drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference
of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. ' 10 3 The majority then concluded that "a less quick look" was necessary for the "initial assessment of the tendency of these professional
one
advertising restrictions," but it did not offer further guidance on how
10 4
should locate future cases on the spectrum of the rule of reason.
Justice Stevens joined Justice Breyer's dissent without writing separately, a relative rarity for him.10 5 The dissent found that the FTC's decision was supported by substantial evidence and the court of appeals
properly applied a form of the quick look. 10 6 Justice Breyer found the
effect of each of the advertising restrictions as applied
anticompetitive
"obvious. ' 10 7 He then acknowledged the legitimate aim of preventing
false and deceptive advertising, but found a lack of empirical support for
the restrictions at issue in the case.' 0 8 He also assumed that the commission was required to show market power, but found sufficient evidence in
the record that such market power was present. 10 9 He concluded by noting that the burden of persuasion had evolved over the years and represented an advance over either an open-ended inquiry where the FTC had
to present and rebut every theory and fact in order to win or where the
government always won with little or no theory or analysis presented. 110
CaliforniaDental is probably the hardest of the rule of reason cases the
Supreme Court has considered, but it is also the most unsatisfying. The
Court has always struggled with the application of antitrust principles to
professional and health care markets. Unlike some of the earlier cases, it
was not easy to completely dismiss the justifications offered by the defendants."' In addition, CaliforniaDental itself involved changing theories by the plaintiff and the courts at each level of the case, as well as the
general administrative law issue of the proper level of deference given to
the findings of the FTC. These factors, plus the general imprecision of
the majority and the dissenting opinions, leave readers with the notion
that the rule of reason is a continuum, with some cases requiring little
market analysis before consideration of the defendant's justifications and
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 780-81.
See id. at 781.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 781-85.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 793-94.
See generally id.
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others requiring more so, but offer little guidance as to how to choose
112
where any individual case falls on that spectrum.
Justice Stevens saw a single unitary rule of reason and ultimately persuaded the majority of his colleagues on the Court, but what implication
does this have on antitrust as a whole? Several important consequences
flow from this view. First, he viewed the rule of reason as a rule of interpretation for all of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, rather than a separate
category applying only to some cases. This has both substantive and
methodological implications. He tended to see the rule of reason in a
common law historical framework so that English common law cases like
Mitchel v. Reynolds,113 nineteenth century Sherman Act cases like Addyston Pipe,114 and the 1955, Attorney General's Report 1

5

play a promi-

nent role in many of Stevens's opinions to determine the inherent or
factual reasonableness or unreasonableness of modern commercial agreements. It also made him less willing to modify or jettison precedent with
strong common law roots.
Stevens also puts more emphasis than many of his colleagues on the
defendant's procompetitive justifications than the plaintiff's proof of
harm. Without such justifications, hard cases become easy since the restraints on competition are not ancillary to any lawful purpose and hence
are unreasonably restrictive on their face.
Viewing the rule of reason in this fashion also leads to a certain unpredictability. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,116 Justice
Stevens dissented because he viewed the case not as being whether intraenterprise conspiracy fell outside the Sherman Act, but whether agreements between corporate affiliates could ever unreasonably restrict competition within the meaning of the rule of reason. 117 He concluded that
the answer was not often, but refused to join the majority's opinion requiring an agreement between two economically independent actors for
112. See Calkins, supra note 91, at 556-57. Following California Dental, the action
moved out of the courts and back to the enforcement agencies to better define how to
apply the middle ground of the rule of reason. The Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission issued joint guidelines as to agreements between competitors which
explore this issue in more detail in different settings. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS (2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
The Federal Trade Commission also has continued to refine and apply its "inherently suspect" test as its principled analytical tool to determine when the burden shifts to a defendant to justify an agreement or risk condemnation under the rule of reason, and it has
received important support from the Courts of Appeals in the Polygram and North Texas
Specialty Physicians cases. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 360-61 (5th
Cir. 2008); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
113. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
114. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
115. See generally 1955 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 34. The 1955 Report has been cited in thirteen Supreme Court cases during Justice Stevens's tenure. All
but two references came in opinions by Justice Stevens.
116. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
117. Id. at 796.
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act to even apply. 118
Similarly, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,119

120
Justice Stevens dissented based on his reading of the rule of reason.
The majority held that a dealer-plaintiff terminated as a result of price
cutting could not prevail on a claim of what was then per se unreasonable
minimum resale price maintenance unless it could show that the defendant had not only terminated the plaintiff by agreement, but also had an
ongoing agreement as to price or price levels with its remaining dealers or
distributors. 121 Instead, Justice Stevens viewed the case through the historical lens of the unified rule of reason and concluded that the agreement was unreasonable regardless of its vertical versus horizontal status,
or its price versus non-price nature. 12 2 Because the agreement to terminate the plaintiff was not ancillary to any potential pro-competitive policy
or practice as required by Addyston Pipe, the agreement123was a "naked"
restraint of competition and was thus illegal on its face.
There are conceptual as well as pedagogical advantages to viewing the
rule of reason in this fashion. Students, scholars, practitioners, policy
makers, and judges struggle with the central question: when does an
agreement unreasonably restrict competition? The unified rule of reason
provides a consistent approach, even if it does not always provide easy
answers. As set forth in Figure 1,124 one way to conceptualize what Stevens has done for antitrust is to examine virtually every agreement in the
following fashion.
Another important consequence of thinking about the rule of reason in
this fashion is to shift the focus from whether a particular type of agreement was or was not per se unlawful to a consideration of whether the
defendant had any pro-competitive justification to offer that are sufficient
to avoid summary condemnation under any version of the rule of reason.
I address this second contribution by Justice Stevens in the next Section.
C.

WHAT DOES AND DOESN'T COUNT UNDER THE RULE OF REASON

The other great theme for Justice Stevens was to focus the application
of the rule of reason on the effect of the agreement on competition, and
competition alone. This prevents the consideration of arguments as to
the societal reasonableness of the agreement once the effect on competition is proved or presumed. While this view of the rule of reason long
predated his tenure on the Court 125 and was expressed in a different con118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 778-79.
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
Id. at 736-58.
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 736-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

124. For a slightly different graphical representation of the rule of reason, see GAVIL,
KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 210.
125. See, e.g., 1955 A-rroRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 5-12.
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FIGURE 1
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text in Sylvania,126 Justice Stevens became its greatest champion.
In Professional Engineers, this meant summary rejection of the defendant's proposed affirmative defense that competitive bidding could produce a threat to public safety in the form of shoddy engineering work by
unscrupulous engineers making unrealistic low ball bids and then using
substandard materials or construction techniques. 12 7 This undoubtedly
could be true in particular instances, but it was legally irrelevant to Justice
Stevens, 2 8 just as it was legally irrelevant in earlier cases that competition might not be an appropriate public policy for certain industries or
that the defendants in fact agreed upon a reasonable price. 129 He concluded that under either a per se presumption of unreasonableness or a
full rule of reason analysis,
the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy
126. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
127. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698-99 (1978).
128. Id. This was not irrelevant to Justice Blackmun who concurred in part, but expressed concern that the ProfessionalEngineers did not require a decision where the rule
of reason could ever take account of benefits other than increased competition. Id. at 699.
Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens would again disagree on this point in the Trial Lawyers case in 1990, with Justice Stevens again writing for the majority in a more controversial
case. See infra text and accompanying notes 142-50.
129. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), affd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined
by statute,
130
that policy decision has been made by the Congress.

Anything else would be a "frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sher13 1
man Act.'
Similarly, the effect on competition was the sole criteria used in considering the justifications offered by the NCAA in Board of Regents.132 The

defendants could not plausibly argue that the broadcast limitations were
necessary to create a new product, as in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colombia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.133 No new blanket license was created for
college football; in fact the same rights were still sold on a school-byschool basis, "only in a non-competitive market."'1 34 Moreover, a desire
to protect live game attendance was inconsistent with the basic policy of
the Sherman Act and was tantamount to the long rejected argument that
1 35
competition itself was unreasonable.
Justice Stevens then inexplicably appeared to lose focus in considering
the defendant's final argument, that the need for "competitive balance
among amateur athletic teams" was a legitimate justification that supported the limitations on broadcast rights.' 36 He assumed without analysis that competitive balance on the field was both legitimate and
important, but rejected this justification as a factual matter since there was
no evidence that the broadcast limitations served this interest in any
way. 137 He stated:

Perhaps the most important reason for rejecting the argument that
the interest in competitive balance is served by the television plan is
the District Court's unambiguous and well-supported finding that
many more games would be televised in a free market than under
the NCAA plan. The hypothesis that legitimates the maintenance of
competitive balance as a procompetitive justification under the Rule
of Reason is that equal competition will maximize consumer demand
for the product. The finding that consumption will materially increase if the controls are removed is a compelling demonstration
that
138
they do not in fact serve any such legitimate purpose.
130. Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (citing in part to the 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 34).

131. Id. at 695.
132. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984).
133. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979).
134. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113-14.
135. Id. at 117.
136. See id. at 117-20.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 119-20. There is a more sophisticated argument that competitive balance can
lead to greater fan interest and greater output (or viewership), therefore constituting a
legitimate competitive rather than social justification. The Supreme Court in Board of
Regents did not pursue this line of argument because it so quickly rejected the factual basis
that the broadcast restrictions could achieve this result. The lower courts have split on
whether competitive balance is a proper potential justification for a competitive restraint.
Compare Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), with Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood
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One would have expected a very different way of reaching the same
result based on the rest of the opinion in Board of Regents and Justice
Stevens's other rule of reason decisions. He appeared to conflate competitive balance, the athletic competition on the field, with the economic
competition that the rule of reason protects. Whether Northwestern's
football team is 0-12, 6-6, or 9-3 in a particular season is simply a different
question than whether limitations on the sale of broadcast rights unreasonably limit competition in that commercial market. 139 Perhaps Justice
Stevens simply took the easy way out and accepted a conceptually shaky
justification precisely because it could be so easily rebutted by the record
at trial. However, it is not clear why he did not dismiss this justification
with a wave of the hand, as he did the similar justification that restricting
broadcast rights to bolster live attendance at games was inconsistent with
140
the fundamental premises of the rule of reason.
If he appeared to waver on competitive effects as the sole concern of
the rule of reason in Board of Regents, Justice Stevens returned to the
topic with more clarity and precision in the controversial FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Association decision. 141 There, the Court considered
an effort by independent criminal defense counsel in the District of Columbia to get the hourly rates for court appointed representation of criminal defendants increased from abysmally low levels. 142 Following
various lengthy unsuccessful lobbying efforts to obtain an increase in the
budget for their work, an informal association of appointed counsel organized a "strike" where they refused to accept additional appointments
unless a raise was forthcoming. 143 This action threatened to paralyze the
Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519,
540-47.
139. Northwestern's football team was 4-4-1 during both the 1945 and 1946 seasons
while Stevens was a law student, although they had been dreadful for some years when the
Board of Regents case was decided. Wildcats: A History of Football at Northwestern,
http://www.library.northwestern.edu/archives/exhibits/football/5.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2009).
140. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 116-17 (1984). The
dissent by Justice White, a former college football star, viewed the majority as improperly
ignoring all non-economic goals of the defendants. Id. at 134 (White, J., dissenting).
141. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). The controversy
and the politics underlying the case are set forth in Donald I. Baker, The Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Case-A Battle on the FrontierBetween Politics and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST
STORIEs 258-59 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
142. D.C. had an unusual system for meeting its constitutional obligations to provide
representation for indigent criminal defendants during the relevant time period. Baker,
supra note 142, at 258-59. A relatively small public defender's office handled less than
10% of the case load and outside lawyers were appointed to handle the rest. Id. at 259.
The bulk of these appointments went to a group of less than 200 "regulars" for whom these
cases were typically the bulk of their practice and income. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 415. By operation of a 1964 statute, compensation was set at $30 an hour
for court appearances and $20 for out of court work, id., with ceilings of $400 for misdemeanors and $1000 for felonies and appeals. Baker, supra note 142, at 259. These minuscule fees were further eroded by inflation between their enactment and the events in the
1980s which led to the law suit. Id. at 259-60.
143. Id. at 262.
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courts. 144 The mayor, D.C. city council quickly responded with an increase in the budget145and the hourly rate of compensation and matters
returned to normal.
The FTC challenged these events as a per se unlawful boycott in support of a horizontal price-fixing agreement.' 46 By the time the matter
came before the Supreme Court years later, the issues had been distilled
down to whether the First Amendment required use of the rule of reason,
rather than the per se rule as used by the Federal Trade Commission, and
whether the defendants' conduct was protected by the Noerr-Pennington
147
doctrine as lawful petitioning for governmental action.
While the wisdom of an enforcement action against low paid criminal
defense lawyers representing the indigent is subject to challenge, the case
nevertheless fit nicely into Justice Stevens's framework for the rule of
reason. Although most of the debate between the majority and dissent
was over the application of the per se rule against the background of the
First and Sixth Amendment issues implicated in the case, 148 for Justice
Stevens it was clear that the case would have come out the same way
under the rule of reason. As he noted early on in the opinion:
Respondents' boycott may well have served a cause that was worthwhile and unpopular. We may assume that the preboycott rates were
unreasonably low, and that the increase has produced better legal
representation for indigent defendants. Moreover, given that neither
indigent criminal defendants nor the lawyers who represent them
command any special appeal with the electorate, we may also assume
that without the boycott there would have been no increase in [the]
fees at least until the Congress amended the federal statute. These
assumptions do not control the case, for it is not our task to pass
upon the social
utility or political wisdom of price-fixing
49
agreements.1
An important part of Justice Stevens's rejection of non-economic and
social justifications under the rule of reason related to institutional concerns. Under his view, it was Congress in the Sherman Act that had mandated a regime of competition for the economy and foreclosed the Court
from accepting otherwise appealing arguments that competition was not
appropriate for a particular industry, that price fixing was reasonable in a
particular circumstance, or that non-economic or social justifications
could justify otherwise anticompetitive agreements. For Justice Stevens,
these were all arguments that should be directed to Congress to either
144. Id. at 263.
145. Id. at 263-64.
146. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 418-19.
147. Id. at 411-33. For a discussion of the ups and downs of the case and how truly little
other than principle was at stake, see Baker, supra note 142.
148. The Court was unanimous in rejecting the argument that the joint conduct was
immune as purely political petitioning. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at
413, 425-27.
149. Id. at 421-22. See also id. at 424 ("The social justifications proffered for respondents' restraint of trade thus do not make it any less unlawful.").
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amend the antitrust laws or grant statutory exemptions as it has in myriad
situations. 150
However, the question remains whether any of these concerns validly
applied in Trial Lawyers. While the respondents could not point to an
exempting statute, they could make credible arguments that their conduct
was justified under the First and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution,
which arguably enshrine the non-economic and social concerns that
prompted their conduct. Justice Stevens may well have reached the correct conclusion in this matter, but he appeared to have given short shrift
to a line of argument that in fact fit the framework for the rule of reason
he had been advocating since joining the Court.
Finally, the focus on competitive effects as the sole subject of the rule
of reason also helps explain Maricopa County, where most of the attention has focused on the question of whether horizontal maximum price
fixing should have been treated as per se unlawful or subject to the rule
of reason. 151 While this was obviously an important and controversial
question for the Court, it obscures the fact that Justice Stevens would not
consider the potential public interest benefits of price fixing, either maximum or minimum, as a cognizable affirmative defense under either the
per se or full rule of reason any more than he would consider the argument that price fixing for a particular industry actually benefits the public
152
or that the agreed-upon price was reasonable.

150. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,388 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The antitrust laws reflect a basic national policy favoring free markets over regulated markets. In essence, the Sherman Act prohibits private unsupervised
regulation of the prices and output of goods in the marketplace. That prohibition is inapplicable to specific industries which Congress has exempted from the antitrust laws and
subjected to regulatory supervision over price and output decisions."); S. Motor Carriers,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 67 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Only Congress, expressly or by implication, may authorize price fixing, and has done so in particular industries or compelling circumstances."); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof't Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 689-90 (1978) ("That kind of argument is properly addressed to Congress and may
justify an exemption from the statute for specific industries, but it is not permitted by the
Rule of Reason.").
151. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). This case was a
4-3 plurality opinion with two justices not participating. Id. at 357. William Kovacic has
detailed how Justice Powell drafted what he thought would be the majority opinion reversing summary judgment with guidance for the lower court on the application of a full rule of
reason analysis on remand only to lose key votes and be forced to write instead in dissent.
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in the O'Connor-RehnquistEra: A View from Inside the Supreme Court, 20 ANTITRUST 21, 21-23 (2006).
152. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 350 n.22. The lower courts are not always faithful to
Justice Stevens's vision of the rule of reason as a rule solely about competitive consequences. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993) (analyzing
agreement to jointly calculate student aid under rule of reason). See generally Robert P.
Taylor, Rule of Reason Cases Since National Society of Professional Engineers, 51 ANrITRUST L.J. 185, 294-95 (1982) (discussing lower court cases permitting health and safety
justifications when competitive impact was slight).
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF TYING

In the tying area, Justice Stevens is best known for his defense of the
quasi-per se rule that as a formal matter still governs this area of the law.
This rule, last reaffirmed in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde,153 holds that the sale or lease of one product or service on the
condition that the purchaser also buy or lease a second product or service
is per se unreasonable if: 1) there is separate demand for the two products or services; 2) the seller has appreciable economic power over the
tying product; and 3) the tying arrangement affects an appreciable vol154
ume of commerce in the tied product.
This unusual quasi-per se rule is, charitably speaking, hanging by a
thread. In Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by
three other justices, points out how the majority's rule requires most of
the work of the full rule of reason but offers none of the benefits, and
how it is facially inconsistent with the treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements often covering the exact same conduct.1 5 5
The lower courts have grafted all kinds of exceptions to even the quasiper se rule retained by the majority of the Supreme Court. 156 Some
bolder appellate courts have simply ignored the teachings of Jefferson
Parishand applied a full rule of reason analysis when they thought it best.
For example, the Seventh Circuit shortly thereafter held that it could be
legal malpractice not to request a rule of reason jury instruction in a tying
case.1 57 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the D.C. Circuit also concluded that a full rule of reason was appropriate for allegations of technological tying involving computer software. 15 8 At the Supreme Court
level, the rejection of per se treatment for resale price maintenance 159
and the jettisoning of the presumption of market power or uniqueness
from the presence of intellectual property rights covering the tying product1 60 all signal that the Court may be receptive to a future head-on challenge to the existing per se rule.
Justice Stevens's defense of the status quo is somewhat surprising given
his prior practice experience, non-judicial writings, and earlier opinions
for the Court. The very first antitrust case that he wrote for the court
arose in a tying context. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., the Court held
that a state regulatory program in which the local electrical utility fol153. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
154. Id. at 15-17.

155. Id. at 35 n.2 (O'Connor concurring). For example, in Jefferson Parish itself, the
lawsuit concerned exclusive dealing from the point of competing doctors excluded from the
operating room of the hospital but could be viewed as tying from the point of view of
patients who could only have an operation at that hospital if they used the hospital anesthetic group. See id. at 4-6.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
157. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Lewis, Overbeck & Furman, 979 F.2d 546, 551-52 (7th Cir.
1992).

158. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
159. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).
160. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
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lowed a regulatory filing under which it gave away light bulbs to residential users was not protected by the state action defense. 16 1 The plurality
opinion by Justice Stevens simply assumed that the program amounted to
unlawful tying and focused on the immunity question as did the dissent. 162 Only Justice Blackmun in a concurrence spent any time analyz163
ing why the program might constitute an unlawful tying arrangement.
Almost immediately, Justice Stevens again wrote for the Court in a
case raising more substantive tying issues. In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc., the Court brought to an end an absurdly long running
case involving the prefabricated housing market. 164 The defendant, U.S.
Steel, had a policy of offering low cost financing in order to help sales
efforts for its prefabricated homes. 165 A competitor in the housing (but
not the finance) market sued claiming that the defendant was tying the
provision of credit to the sale of homes through the use of uniquely low
cost financing. 166 An earlier version of the case had made it to the Supreme Court in 1969, before Justice Stevens's arrival. 167 Then the Court
reversed summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to the opportunity to prove that the defendant had "appreci16 8
able economic power" in the market for the tying product (credit).
On the second go around, Justice Stevens wrote for an unanimous
Court that U.S. Steel's willingness to provide relatively cheap credit to
sell relatively expensive housing in no way constituted the presence of the
appreciable economic power or an otherwise unique product necessary
for the invocation of the traditional per se tying rules. 169 Again, the
Court did not question or examine the merits of the per se rule itself.
Justice Powell's notes on the case indicate that Justice Stevens voted to
take certiorari and further suggest that Justice Stevens was ambivalent
about the current state of the law. 170 Justice Powell noted: "Stevens says
if economic power alone is test. Stevens
any tie could be invalidated
17 1
thinks case is weak."'
In Jefferson Parish, the Court unanimously refused to impose liability
on the basis of the hospital's exclusive dealing contract with one particu161. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 581, 603 (1976).
162. Id. at 581, 592, 614-15.
163. Id. at 612-14. Based on the information in the Supreme Court opinion, the allegation that Detroit Edison's purchase of light bulbs and subsequent free distribution to consumers seems rather benign, even if the practice caused losses for retail outlets like drug
stores which sold competing bulbs. See id. at 613-14. Nonetheless, the fact that the Court
simply assumed this was a potential violation and reversed on immunity questions, required the remand of the case for trial on the merits and a sub silentio affirmation of the
status quo on tying law. See id. at 603.
164. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 611-12 (1977).
165. Id. at 614-15.
166. Id. at 612 n.2.
167. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp, 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
168. Id. at 503-04.
169. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977).
170. Notes of Justice Lewis Powell, United States Steel Corp. et al v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., No. 75-853 (Papers of Justice Lewis Powell, Washington & Lee University).
171. Id.
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lar anesthesiology group, but the justices did so on radically different theories. 172 Justice Stevens, for the majority, first characteristically noted
that "[c]ertain types of contractual arrangements are deemed unreasonable as a matter of law."1 73 He then stated: "It is far too late in the history
of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tyrisk of stifling competition and
ing arrangements pose an unacceptable
74
therefore are unreasonable 'per se."1
His opinion held that per se condemnation, i.e., a finding of unreasonableness without inquiry into actual market conditions, was appropriate
only upon proof that a defendant: (1) had market power (or one selling
some other type of unique product or service); and (2) forced buyers of a
substantial volume of commerce into purchasing two products or services
without offering them separately.' 75 Only after these threshold issues
have been surmounted did Justice Stevens find per se prohibition appropriate.' 76 Without explicitly using this terminology, he thus situated tying
law along the unitary rule of reason, similar to group boycotts, in requiring proof of certain market facts before conclusively presuming
unreasonableness.
As to the substance of the tying allegations, Justice Stevens held that
the provision of surgical services and anesthesiology services were indeed
two distinct services for which there was separate demand, rather than a
single functionally integrated bundle. 177 Many patients (usually indirectly through their primary care physician or surgeon) wanted to choose
their own anesthesiology provider and use someone other than the doc178
tors affiliated with the hospital where the surgery would be performed.
indicated that this was particularly the case with obThe record further
179
stetric medicine.
On the question of market power and forcing, Justice Stevens concluded that no forcing could be presumed since the defendant had only a
thirty percent market share in the New Orleans market.' 80 The Court
reversed and remanded for consideration8 of whether liability could be
established under the full rule of reason.' '
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence joined by Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist which reached the same
conclusion as Justice Stevens, but took direct aim at the existing quasi-per
172. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 3-4, 32 (1984).
173. Id. at 9.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 11-12.
176. Id. at 15-18.
177. Id. at 22.
178. Id. at 22-23.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 26-27.
181. Id. at 31-32. It is not clear how the plaintiff could prevail under the rule of reason
since it has already been found to lack market power, and even if it could otherwise establish anticompetitive harm, the defendants could offer evidence of efficiencies and other
justifications.
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se rule. 1 82 In addition to viewing the provision of general hospital ser-

vices, operating room facilities, and anesthesiology as a single functional
item, she forcefully advocated for the treatment of all tying arrangements
under the full rule of reason. 83 She argued that the existing approach
required all the work of the rule of reason in defining markets and measuring power and enjoyed none of the benefits by precluding evidence
that the specific arrangement had benign or even pro-competitive effects
184
in a particular case.
While Justice Stevens was not willing to jettison the limited per se rule
that follows proof of market power, he was more than willing to re-examine what constituted, or presumed to constitute, market power in the
tying area. In Illinois Toll Works, Inc. Independent Ink, Inc., he authored
the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that the mere existence of a
patent or other intellectual property right would not justify a presump185
tion of market power in a tying case.
In this instance, history simply is not a complete guide to Stevens's
views on tying in Jefferson Parish. In his article Tying Arrangements written for a conference following the 1955 Attorney General's Report, Justice Stevens touched on many of the themes that can be found in the
O'Connor concurrence. 186 He expanded on a footnote in the report
which questioned whether tying should be "almost universally regarded
as [a] monopolistic device[ ].-'187 He began his analysis by noting: "[T]he
more one thinks about tying agreements the harder it is to reach a satis1 88
factory conclusion as to just what is that is objectionable about them.
He continued with an extended example about the competitive equivalence of a basic sales contract, a requirements contract, and a tying contract in the gasoline industry and questioned why they should be treated
differently under either Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the
18 9
Clayton Act.

He then analyzes the seller's motives for such arrangements. He accepted the one monopoly profit theory and, thus, rejected the notion that
a seller could ordinarily obtain more profits through foisting a tying arrangement on an unwilling buyer. 190 He recognized the exceptions for a
seller trying to avoid either maximum price regulations, minimum resale
182. Id. at 32-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan and Marshall concurred
and wrote separately briefly to state their support for the long standing precedent of the
tying rule. Id. at 32.

183. Id. at 33.
184. Id. at 34. Justice O'Connor also argued that the case at hand was indistinguishable
from an exclusive dealing contract which was already subject to examination under the rule
of reason. Id. at 35 n.2.
185. I11.Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
186. Stevens, Tying Arrangements, supra note 33. For whatever reason, this article by
Justice Stevens was not cited by any of the parties or the opinions in the Jefferson Parish
litigation.
187. 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 138 n.32.
188. Stevens, Tying Arrangements, supra note 33, at 135.
189. Id. at 135-39.
190. Id. at 135-42.
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maintenance required by state law, or seeking to price discriminate by
metering consumption of the tied product.1 91
He concluded:
I am merely trying to suggest that there may be a variety of reasons
for adopting a policy of refusing to sell item A except on condition
that item B also be purchased. In some settings the policy may appear entirely reasonable, although in others it might be objectionable
.... I would like very briefly to suggest that in fact the law on tying
192

agreements does not go beyond the law on requirements contract.

One has to work hard to reconcile such statements with the language in
the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish that "[iut is far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition
and therefore are unreasonable 'per se." 193 However, it is not impossible. In 1955, even Justice Stevens acknowledged that the issue of monopoly power was key to distinguishing between those tying arrangements
which threatened competition and those which were benign. 194 The rest
of the 1955 conference article was premised on demonstrating the need
for not condemning outright those tying arrangements where the seller
lacked monopoly power.
Justice Stevens's language in Jefferson Parish is most concerned with
the situation where there is a monopolist and "forcing" is involved, although these factors were not present in the case itself. The emphasis on
"forcing" in Jefferson Parish was a concern to Justice Rehnquist who
wrote to Stevens after seeing the first draft of the opinion indicating:
I think this case offers an opportunity to cut back on the broad
sweep of the per se prohibition against tying, and I am reluctant to
join an opinion which passes up that opportunity, to say nothing of
one which may broaden its sweep. Given the difficulties in defining
"products," perhaps Lewis is correct that the per se prohibition
195
should be dropped altogether in favor of the Rule of Reason.
Justice Stevens quickly replied that same day to all the other justices. He
wrote: "As it seems to happen from time to time, the message the author
intended to convey is apparently not that which the reader discerned in
the opinion. I frankly had intended the 'forcing' language to limit the per
se concept rather than to expand it."' 196 One can thus read Justice Stevens's writings from the 1950s and the 1980s as at least consistent on the
question of how to handle tying claims by firms with market power and
191. See id. at 140-44.
192. Id. at 145.
193. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (emphasis added).
194. Stevens, Tying Arrangements, supra note 33, at 148.
195. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice John Paul Stevens, Re: 82-1031
Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde (Jan. 4, 2004) (Blackmun Papers).
196. Memorandum from John Paul Stevens to the Conference, Re: 82-1031 - Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde (Jan. 4, 1984) (Blackmun Papers).
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why both he and O'Connor ultimately were willing to quickly dispose
(albeit on different grounds) of a claim by a seller without such power.
However, something else entirely may be going on. While speculative,
Justice Stevens may have been engaged in holding the line on per se rules
far beyond the limited and questionable per se rule applicable in tying
cases. Jefferson Parish came only two short years after Justice Powell's
attempt in Maricopa County to question the more stringent per se presumption in horizontal maximum pricing 197 and almost simultaneous to
the attempt in Monsanto to limit the per se presumption against vertical
price fixing. 198 In fact, that presumption eventually fell as to any form of
vertical price fixing in the Leegin case, in which Justice Stevens dissented. 199 Although the publicly available papers do not shed light on
this view of his defense of per se presumptions more generally, it is one
way of seeing Justice Stevens's otherwise partially conflicting views over
time about tying in a broader and more consistent historical context.
E.

THE UNSOLVED PUZZLE OF BALANCING

The only area of the rule of reason where Justice Stevens has made
only a limited contribution is the nearly empty corner of Figure 1 where
no conclusive presumptions apply, the plaintiff nonetheless has established harm to competition, and the defendant has offered legally and
factually cognizable procompetitive justifications. According to the black
letter law, the court (or agency) is supposed to weigh the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the agreement and then decide if the agreement
unreasonably restricts competition and does not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the lawful purpose involved. 20 0 This is the
01
full rule of reason test laid out in Board of Trade of Chicago.2
2
0
2
In practice, virtually no court ever actually does so.
When the plaintiff can establish that the defendant lacks a legitimate pro-competitive
justification or offers only pre-textual ones, it wins.20 3 When the defendant actually has a cognizable pro-competitive justification, it almost always wins.20 4 The courts almost never explicitly balance the harms and
20 5
benefits, and they are ill-equipped to do in the average Section 1 case.
197. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357-58 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
198. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 755, 764 (1984).
199. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).

200. Id.
201. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
202. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason, Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 1265; GAVIL, KOVACIC, & BAKER, supra note 16, at 207-08.
203. Carrier, supra note 203, at 1268.

204. Id.
205. See id. at 1267-68. This is increasingly true in Section 2 cases as well. In Microsoft,
the court set forth a four part test for unlawful monopolization that closely tracked the rule
of reason under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, the government prevailed where it could prove that
the defendant's justification was pretextual or legally insufficient, otherwise the defendant
carried the day. Id. In no instance did the court ever get to the true balancing required

2009]

The Rule of Reason

This is particularly true at the Supreme Court level where cases are
often vehicles to announce the tests the lower courts should be using,
6
rather than reviewing in detail the lower court's decision for error. 20 It
would be a rare instance where the Supreme Court both took and resolved a Section 1 case to determine whether the lower court or agency
correctly weighed the pro- and anticompetitive consequences of a particular agreement in restraint of trade, although that is precisely what the
rule of reason says is supposed to happen in the vast majority of cases.
Even if the Court thought the balancing was out of whack, it would more
likely remand the case for further proceedings, rather than re-do the balancing on the basis of a cold record.
Justice Stevens thus only undertook such a balancing once in his time
on the Court, and then only in dissent. In all of the other cases discussed
above, the proffered justifications were rejected for legal or factual reasons and the case only presented harm and no cognizable justification,
with no ensuing balancing required. Only in Broadcast Music did Justice
Stevens take the next step and conclude that the rule of reason applied,
but the anticompetitive consequences outweighed the benefits of the new
blanket license, and he did so alone in dissent as to this part of the
case.20 7 The majority, including Justice Stevens, held that case should be
decided under the full rule of reason, but instead remanded to the lower
20 8
courts for a new trial.
The empty set of the balancing portion of the rule of reason depicted in
Figure 1 is understandable, but unfortunate. Each case will be heavily
fact specific and ill-suited to Supreme Court review, which could offer
only affirmance or reversal and remand with generalities that would not
necessarily be helpful for the next case in the pipeline. For these cases,
we are left with the mush of Chicago Board of Trade20 9 and a general
reluctance of the Court to say anything further on the subject.

under its own test when both harm and justification were present. Id.; see also Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Conwood Co. v. U.S.
Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
206. Although not a Section 1 case, this was precisely the issue in Brooke Group, where
members of the Court wanted to dismiss the case altogether after oral argument until a
majority of justices coalesced around using the case as a vehicle to announce a new restrictive theory of predatory pricing. Conference Notes, No. 92-466, Brooke Group v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Blackmun papers); Memorandum to the Conference from
Justice John Paul Stevens, Re: 92-466 - Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. (Apr. 1, 1993) (Blackmun Papers).
207. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
208. Id. at 24-25. On remand, the defendant prevailed, the verdict was affirmed on
appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y
of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 970, 970 (1981); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 607 F.2d 543, 544 (2nd Cir. 1979).
209. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
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CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens's common law methodology is by no means limited to
the antitrust area. Scholars have noted the overall common law methodology that is central to other areas of Stevens's jurisprudence as well. For
example, Ward Farnsworth, while not addressing the antitrust cases, observed that Stevens tended to rely on the facts of the case, weighing benefits and burdens, and using a sliding scale of review with analytical
distinctions along the way. 210 While Professor Farnsworth was specifically talking about the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment, little change would be needed to use the same terms to describe the
rule of reason. 2 1a With respect to the due process limits to punitive damages, Professor Farnsworth describes Justice Stevens as laying out the
"factors [that] are considered that produce a judgment on the facts[;]...
'21 2
the balancing will have to be repeated by other judges in other cases.
In the end, Justice Stevens ultimately gave us (at least in the antitrust
field) more than case-specific judgments with vague standards for application by subsequent lower courts. He drew on his personal and professional influences, the common law traditions of antitrust, and the
ancillary restrains rule to help redefine the rule of reason as a continuum
rather than a dichotomous set of choices. He further clarified that the
rule of reason was a rule about the competitive consequences of agreements and not their societal or general reasonableness.
This Article has sought to identify some of the influences that led Justice Stevens to rule and write the way he has done in the dozens of antitrust opinions, concurrences, and dissents he has written as a member of
the Supreme Court since 1976. Some of those influences are the work
and teaching of his teacher and friend James Rahl of Northwestern, Stevens's own practice experience, his antitrust scholarship, and often his
service on the 1955 Attorney General Committee. As to the meaning of
the rule of reason, the core issue in antitrust law, these influences can be
seen in his approach and his prose in his opinions, although one will
never know whether they specifically caused or dictated the results, reasoning, and language that he used.
He was not always consistent and did not solve every remaining puzzle
in this important field of law, but he was broadly guided by these principles in his antitrust jurisprudence on and off the bench. In so doing, he
made antitrust law more rational, more coherent, and dare one say, more
reasonable.

210. Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism,and John PaulStevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 158, 179 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003). See generally William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of
Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087 (1989).
211. Farnsworth, supra note 212 at 163.
212. Id. at 179.
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